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The Congressional Budget Process:

Impact on the Senate

The House of Representatives fills an extremely important rQle under
our constitutional system. , But if there was one stroke of genius - and
there was more - that came ',from the minds of those constitutional forebears; it was the Senate, because it is here where men will stand against
the storms of political frenzy and in many instances throw the light of
public scrutiny upon legislation which would otherwise be detrimental to
the Republic •. I do not warit to see the Senate become a second House of
Representatives. 1
-Senate Minority Leader, Robert Byrd, .·
June 24, 1981

It was during the great reconciliation batt1¢ o.f 1981 and on the House
side of Capitol Hill the storms of political frenzy were raging. The'Repub1ican-conservative alliance was in the process of upending·the Democratic
majority admidst name-calling and bad feelings on both sides. Both the
House and Senate were trying to agree on cuts of over $35 billion to existing programs and many sacrTd cows were being sacrificed. But there was less
turbulence in the Senate.

1

Reflecting their cherished traditions the Senate

attempted to demonstrate - in Senator Byrd's words - that they were not like
"the other body. 11
The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 changed the way in which
the U.S. Congress deals with the fiscal affairs of the nation.

In attempting

to assess the impact of the congressional budget process on the Senate, one
must consider issues conc~rning the Senate and Congress as legislative institutions and the many kiinds of effects the budget process has had in terms_
of legislative procedures, political power, and national policy. ·what are

2

the changes? What difference do they make? ls the House really different
than the Senate? What is there about the Senate in the 1980s.that helps
us understand the impact of the budget process and what is there about the
budget process that helps us understand the Senate of the 1980s?
As assessment must begin with at .least a brief look at the modern·
Senate and recent transitions. The role of the Senate in the fonnulation
of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the provisions. of that
-

law should be examined.

.

.

.. .

We will focus particularly on the:Senate Budget

Corrmittee, designed t~ implement and enforce the budget process in the
Senate.

Because of the importance of 1981 with Republican control of the

Senate and the use of the reconciliation process, we will compare the record.of budgeting in the Senate from 1975-1980 with the later period.· Finally, we will attempt to draw s·ome general .conclusions about the impact
of budget reform in the Senate.
TRANSITIONS IN THE SENATE
The Senate of the 1950s was the Citadel, 2 the Inner Club, the Senate
Establishment". 3 It was a legislative body with a strong set of norms of
behavior or "folkways. 11-4 But the Senate was changing. By t-he 1960s,
Randall B. Ripley characterized power in the Senate as shifting from decentralized to individualistic. 5 By the 1970s, other changes had been
'

.

observed. The Senate had larger Democratic majorities and had become more
liberal. 6 While committees in the Senate have not tended to be -as strong
'

'

or as important as in the House, they form an important part of the individualistic power structure.

Under the Johnson rule, every Senator was

guaranteed a major committee assignment and many chairmanships were assumed
by members with less seniority than in the past. -Assessing the power structure of the Senate in the 1970s, Norman Ornstein et al concluded that power

3
was more indiv1dualisti,c and evenly distributed than before:

"The Senate

1s a more open and fluid and decentralized body·-nowthan it was inthe
1950s.

Power, resources, and decision-making authority have become more
diffuse. 117
By the 1980s, the Sen_ate had evolved again, with the change

in. the .

ideological makeup_ - ~he defeat of prominent liberals a~d the election of·
a Republican majority for the first time in a quarter century.,. being the
most significant change. . But even the 97th Senate was recogni zab 1e to·
the handful of Senators who had served in the 87th Senate, twenty years
before.

It 1s still a legislative body that respects deliberation,· unlim-

ited debate, independence, and does not look for strong centra 11 zed leadership.

Although, as we noted, corrmittees are not as dominant in the Senate,

they are still the most important work groups.
and prestige are still respected.

Values of corrmittee autonomy

In the Senate of the 1980s, even with a

conservative, Republican majority, structures and processes tend to serve
member needs and a decentralized, individualistic power structure.
BUDGET REFORM IN THE SENATE,
The centralizing budget process implemented after the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 would at.first glance appear to be at odds
with the traditional norms of the Senate.
so in rea 1i ty than on paper.

However, this is actually less

From the original appointment of the Joint

Committee on Budget Control in 1972, Senators were careful to mind traditi anal interests and va 1ues.

Countervai 1i ng these conserving tendencies

were the demands for reform:

greater control of the budget as a whole

(as opposed to traditional concern with only budget_parts) to halt the
sp.iral of spending growth.

4

The Joint Study Committee.issued their report in Apri 1 of 1973 and
made a number of specific .recommendations for restructuring the congressi ona-1 budget process. 8 The Senate Government Operati ans Committee began
work on the legislation· about this time.

Unlike the Joint Study Commit-·

.

.

tee or the House Rules Corrmittee which ·had drafted the House version of the
bi11, th~ Senate corrmittee reflected the interests of the authorizing committees .. :senators declined to foHow the House lead i_n specifying a quota
of seats for members of the Finance and Appropriations Committees, or in
limiting a member's tenure on the Budget committee.

Like the Joint ·corrmit-

tee report and the House version of the .bi 1l; they provided for the creation
of a new Senate committee to oversee a, highly structured, careful lY orchestrated budget process superimposed -on the old authorization-appropriations
process.
In December of 1973, the focus shifted from the Government Operati ans
Committee to the Senate Rules Conmittee.

Majority leader Robert Byrd took

charge of the legislation and reopened negotiations to further balance the
1nterests of the spending committees. 9 The compromise designed by Byrd
supported the authorizing committees by loosening the provisions that gave
-the Appropriations conmittee tighter control ·of backdoor spending.

However,

Byrd supported the Appropriations corrmittee's position on the second concurrent resolution and reconciliation.
ests was explicit.

The.balancing of conmittee inter.-

The Senate was able to, "add a new and comprehensive

budgetary framework to the existing decision-making processes with minimum
disruption to established methods and procedures. 1110
;.

· The most obvious difference between the House and Senate provisions
was the weakness of the House Budget Committee.

In the House, the Ways

· and Means and Appropriations committees were able to insure themselves direct representation on the Budget_ Committee. and 1imit the tenure a member may·
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have on the committee.

Committee -self interest was behind these provisions

as much as anything else.

In the Senate, there was no perceived need to in-

stitutionalize a weak budget corrmittee. This new panel was less threatening
than in the House, reflecting a difference in the '.distribution of power in
the two legislative chambers .. Nonetheless, one clearly observes accorrmoda.;.
tion to committee interests in formulating the legislation in the Senate.
Accomnodation and deference to other committees also characterizes the implementation of the budget: proces_s 1n the Senate, despite the emphasis
placed on the aggressive and combative nature of the Senate Budget Conmittee
by many observers.
THE PRACTICE OF BUDGETING IN iHE SENATE 1975-1980
The Senate has been able to adapt to the new requi'rements- of the Budget
Act better.than their House counterparts, where the battles have been more
protracted and the debate more acrimonious.

Budget resolutions have passed

the Senate consistently by margins of a.bout 2 to 1. Bipartisan support for
the budget resolutions was fostered by the cooperation of Budget Committee
Chairman Edmund Muskie and ranking minority member Henry Bellmen.
Senate support for budget resolutions is best demonstrated

by

examining

the history of roll call voting on the floor of the House and Senate. Table

1 sunmarizes these votes between 1975 and 1980 .. While the House votes were
· {Table 1 here)
sharply partisan and decided by very close margins, the resolutions were
supported "by up to half of the Senate Republicans.
feated on the floor as in the House.
not conflicts.

No resol uti ans were de-

This is not to say that there were

Senator Muskie took an. active stance on .enforcing the bud-

get resolution and challenged various spending bills on the Senate floor.
Although the Budget Committee lost these votes as often as they won, this

/

I

.-·

TABLE~
Votes on Budget Resolutions. 1975-1980 .
House and Senate

~

. 1!filg

~

;}

-

•
.~·,

Democrats

· Northern
Democrats
Yes-No

SouthernDemocrats
Yes-No

~

Resolution/Bill

.Vote
Yes-No·

S/ 1/75

1st Resolution. FY 1976

200-196

3-128

197-68

151-33.

46-35

11/12/75

2nd Resolution, FY 1976

· 225-191

11-124

214-67

·162-31

52-36

4/29/76

1st Resolution. FY 1977

221-155

13-111

208-44 ·

· 159-20

40-24

9/ 9/76

2nd Resolution. FY 1977

227-151

· 12-113

215-38

154-16

61-22.

2/23/77

3rd Resolution, FY 1977

239-169

14-119

· 225-50

176-15

49-35

. 4/27/77

1st Resolution, FY 1978

84-320

2-135

· 82-185

Republicans
Yes-No
·

· Yes-No

50-132

32-53

5/ 5/77

Revised 1st Res •• FY 1978

213-179 ·

7-121

206~58

142-39

64-19

9/ 8/77

2nd Reso 1uti on. FY 1978 ·

199-188

4-129

195-59

139-32

56-27

5/10/78

· 1st Resolution, FY 1979

201-197

3-136·

198-61"

152-25

46-36

8/16/78

2nd Resolution~ FY 1979

· 217-178

2-136

.215-42

154-25

61-17

5/14/79

1st Resolution, FY 1980

220-184

9-134

211-50

147-33

64-17

9/27/79

2nd. Resolution, FY 1980

212-206

0-154

+85-77 ·

122-57

63-20

5/ 7/80

1st Resolution, FY 1981

225-193

. 22-131

· 203-62

128-54

75-8

11/18/80

2nd Resolution. FY 1981

205-191

2-146

201-45

133-33

68-12

9/ 4/80

Reconciliation. FY 1980
{adoption.of rule}

206-182

0-143

206-39

142-27

64-12

·SENATE
5/.1/75

1st Resolution, FY 1976

69-22

19-18

50-4

36-1

14-3

11/20/75

2nd Resolution, FY 1976

69-23

19-15

50~a

41-0

9-8

4/12/76

1st -Resolution, FY 1977

· 62-22

17-16

45-6

32-4

13-2

9/ 9/76

2nd Resolution •. FY 1977

55-23

14.;.18

41-5

27-3

14-2

5/ 4/77

1st Resolution, FY 1978

56-31.

15-17

41-14.

36-3

9/ 9/77.

2nd Resolution, FY 1978

63-21

17-13

47-8

33-4

14-4

4/26/78

1st Resolution, FY 1979

64-27

16-19

48-8

35-4

13-4

9/ 6/78

2nd Reso 1ution, FY 1979

55..;18

· 14-12

42-6

30-3

12-3

4/25/79

1st Resolution, FY 1980

64-20

20-15

44.;.5

29-4

15.;.l

9/19-79

2nd Resolution, FY 1980

52.:.35

17-22

45-14

28-12

17-2

5/12/80

1st Reso1ution. FY 1981

68-28

19-22

49-6

31-5

18-1

11/20/80

2nd Resolution, FY 1981

50-38

14-20

36-18

24-11

12-7

.,..

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.
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did not erode the support for their work in assembling the resolutions.
-

.

.

As

. .

we shall see, support for the budget resolutions remained solid under the ·
Republicans, but the nature of voting ·alignments. changed sharply.
What is the Senate Budget Committee like compared with other Senate
committees and the House Budget Committee? Although other Senate commit-

.

-

J

..

tees were not fonna 11y represented on the Budget Cammi ttee as. in _the House, ·
a form of de facto representation existed, as part of a process of accommo.

dation.

.

One of the accommodations to the Appropriations Committee was in-

formal representation on the Budget Corrmittee .. In the 94th Congress, four
of the ~i xteen members of the Budget Committee were on Appropriations.

the 95th Congress, this increased to six of sixteen members.

In

The Senate

Appropriations Committee had about twice the numerical representation on
the Budget Cammi ttee than the House Appropriations Committee had with its
five guaranteed seats.

The Appropri-at ions Cammi t tees had received other

concessions in the Budget Act such as the restrictions ·on. backdoor spending.
But this informal accommodation to the Senate Appropriations Coll1llittee was
important becuase they had the most to lose from the creation of an independent Budget Committee.
The Senate Finance Committee, by comp·arison, had only one of its· members on the Budget Cammi ttee in the 95th Congress.

But accorrmodati on to

the Finance ·Committee was· 1ess · important becaus·e ·the budget process posed
less threat to their autonomy and power.

In the· formulation .of the Budget·

Act, Finance had been able to prevent mo.re explicit revenue figures from.
being included in the resolutions.

the publicized "battles" between Muskie

and Long between 1975 and 1979 did not alter the fact that the Finance ·
Committee 1 s domainwas-fairly secure from the start.

7

Compared to the House Committee members, Senate Budget Committee members have tended to have lower s~ni.ority than House members. Ellwood a·nd
Thurber reported that in the 94th Congress, their average number of years
in the Senate was 8.8 years compared to an average of 14.8 years in·the
H<>use. 11 By mai ntai ni ng nonns of conmittee service, a seat on the Budget
committee was more attractive to younger members of the Senate. This has
contributed to the greater strength of the Senate Budget _Committee.
Are ideological differences within the Senate Conmittee less than
within the House Committee? This wouldappear to. be a logical explanation
for the conflict within the House Committee compar:ed to the Senate Committee.

In the 95th Congress, House Budget Committee Democrats were more ·

1i beral and Republicans were more conservative than their .party as a whole . 12

But ideology does not seem to' explain the differences, because the same
split was found on the Senate Committee. Senate Budget Conmittee Democrats had higher ADA ratings than all Senate Democrats (about 5 points
higher) while Committee Republicans have lower ADA ratings than all Senate
Republicans (about 16 points lower.*) The same conclusion is reached using
ACA (Americans for Cons.titutional Action) ratings as a measure of conservatism.

In spite of an ideological split, similar to that of the House Com-

mittee, other factors have intervened to produce a less volatile, more harmonious committee.
By constituting the Senate Budget as a regular standing committee,
traditional norms of seniority, corrmittee loyalty, and restrained partisa,:iship were preserved. Members have incentives to prevent the all out con;.

. flict that has taken place on the House. side. However, as Richard Fenno
suggests, Senate committees.tend to be more permeable than House committees;
*Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ·ratings.: provide a rough scale of
1i berali sm. Higher Scores are more 1i beral, lower, more ·conservative.
See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports. Actua·l figures for 94th
Congress and comparisions with 97th Senate follow in the next section see Table 2.

8

they are not impregnable. 13 TradJtional committee norms. are only part of
.

.

.

-

the answer. The Senate Budget Committee balanced committee prestige with
a recognition of individual member needs and a decentralized power structure, consistent with the general trends of the Senate in the late 1970s ~ ·
It appeared both in committee leadership and _; n committee deci sion-ma·king
processes.
Senators Muskie and Bellmen combined to provide leadership of the Budget Committee based on bipartisanship and consensus building. Senators
Hollings (D-SC) and Domenici (R-NM) appear to have continued their ~radition after the departure of Muskie and Bellman, although the strains may
be even greater in the 1980s. There is conflict on the conmittee, and it
often develops along party lines, but it resembles what John Manley has
called "restrained partisanship. 1114 Once the choices were made, the committee. presented a united front on the Senat~ floor, and urged members of
both parties to support their position. Senator Bellmen expressed this
philosophy in opposing cuts in the first Resolution for FY 1979:
SENATOR BELLMON: (I) voted for an even larger cut in spending
during the markup of the resolution and.~ •• this puts me in
somewhat of a dilemma. I have, since t~e Budget Conmittee was
formed, consistently taken the positton that we ought to work
as a committee, work our wills, make the best decisions we
could, and then, having come to that conclusion, we ought to
support that decision as a committee so that- when we came to
the floor we would not each of us be going in our separate directions and, in this way, weaken the budget process... So, ·
attractive as I find the Senator's amendment to be, I must
say that I feel at this time, partially because other committees wi 11 not have known in advance about the impact that s·uch
cuts might have on the areas of their concern, that the amendment should be rejected. 15
Rol 1 call votes - within the committee during its first few years are in-

.

structive in analyzing decision-making processes. Of the-72 recorded roll
ca 11 votes between 1975 and 1977,

~

were straight party 1i ne votes. This

compares with 14 percent for.the House committee.

Over half (54%) of those

9

votes in the Senate Budget Committee were party votes where a majority of
Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans .. While this is significantly
lower thanthe 78 percent party votes in the House Budget Committee, the
figure is still telatively high compared to other Senate committees ... Wit.h
three conservative Democrats who voted with the .Republicans more often
than with the majority party, Muskie could not look on 1y to members .of his
own party ·for support on crucial conmittee votes, .furt~er promoting bipartisanship.
· Although Senate Republicans, as a group, had the· lowest party cohesion
scores (of the four caucuses) .. in fl oar voting, in. committee votes they had
higher party support scores than the Democrats. This was a harbinger of a
floor voting pattern that wou1d emerge in the Republican Senate. Th~ co;. ·
operation contrasted with the pattern•observedinthe House on voting agreement between chairman and ranking minority .member in this same peri.od.
;.

Muskie and Bellman voted togethefon 36 of 72 recorded votes, exactly half~.
Agreement between leaders of the House committee was only 14 percent· on all
votes cast in committee.

In comparison with the House, p~rtisanship :On

the Budget committee is clearly more restrained.

Not only has restrained partisanship enhanced the power and prestige
of the Senate. Budget Committee, .but it has al so served individual· member
needs far better than unrestrained partisanship. · 'Each committee member can
expect to play a meaningful role on the committee.· With the fluid nature
of voting alignments on the committee, members can maximize their bargaining
power. This is reflected in higher conmittee attendance and participation
than in the House.
'

The norm of specialization is ·generally stronger in the House than the
Senate, but on the Budget Cammi ttee, it is a norm to be avoided. Members

10
are expected to be generalists, not specialists. Since the committee must
balance the desires and requests.of a variety of competing interests, they
must avoid being advocates of a particular set of agencies, programs. or
another standingcommi-ttee. One member described the differences with the
House:
I detect more of a constitutency thing on the House side members pushing for their pet functions. This causes problems
when it is brought to the floor. We have much le.ss of this on
the Senate side. One of the reasons we have been successful
is that the committee is an accurate reflection of the .makeup
of the.Senate. Items fought out in the committee are not
·fought on the floor. 16
The committee attempted to show the Senate that they are not advocates of
any particular point of view, rather, that they are only concerned with fiscal policy and discipline •.
Decision-making processes adopted by the committee reflect accomodation .
to individual member needs and deference to existing Senate·power.

For ex-

ample, the Senate comnittee has been less specific in its subtotals than
the House, avoiding considering line items, or specific programs within the
functional totals.
Accommodation to individual member needs is apparent in the way a bud;.
get resolution is formulated.

Unlike Representatives Brock Adams (D-Wash)

and Robert Giaimo (D-Conn), Chairmen of the House Budget Conmittee in the
1970s, Senator Muskie did not begin with a specific chairman's. 11 mark. 11 The
committee in the Senate considered 'a total for an entire function, often .
without any further specification of how the total is to be subdivided be~
tween committees.

'

In addition, the Senate Committee began deliberations

using the current policy estimates (projections of a standpat budget provided by the CBC) as .a baseline, while the House used requests in the Pres;.
i dent' s budget as a base 1i ne.

11

By not establishing a chainnan 1 s mark, committee members were more

•,

fully involved in the process of fixing totals._ One of the major comp·laints ·
of House conmittee members, especially the Republicans, was that the chairman'_s figures are presented as a fait accompli, and that the committee discussions were usually ignored by the chairman (and a majority of the Democrats).

The process of decision~making adopted by the Senate Budget Commit.

.

tee from 1975-1980 1imit_ed the number of complaints from standing committees
about the incursions on their territory, and fostered fuller participation
by committee members.
The budget process in the Senate was a significant departure from past
practices, superimposing. a new apparatus over the old appropriations-authorization-revenue process.-

Nonetheless, from formulation, selection of mem'

bers, to decision-making, the committee had carefully made sure the budget
process "fit" the·Senate.

BUDGETING IN THE REPUBLICAN SENATE
By 1981, only three Democrats and one ·Republican remained from the original Senate Budget Corrmittee., In the 97th Congress, half of the twelve Re-·
I

publicans on the committee were freshman while all ten Democrats had served
in the 96th Congress.

Informal representation of other committees continued

in the 97th Congress, again favoring members of the Appropriations Committee.
Four- Democrats - Hollings, Chiles, Johnson, and Sasser - and two Republicans
- Andrews and Kasten - also served on the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Although no Democrats in the 97th Congress served simultaneously on Budget
and Finance, three of the Re pub 1i cans a1so are on the Senate Finance ·cormni ttee.

The overlap of Appropriations and BudgetCorrmittees, and the increase

in the number of Finance Committee members on the Budget Committee-, continues an important trend.

It helps facilitate communication and negotiation

I
:

!

12
on possibly contentious taxing and spending issues.
Has the ideological orientation of the committee changed in the .97th
Congress? Recall that we found in the. Senate Budget COJnmittee as ideologically divided on paper as the House Budget._ Committee, but much less di vi sive and partisan.in practice. Table -2 compares the liberali~m/conservatism
(Table 2 here)
of the first Budget Committee with the committee·in the 97th Congress.

The

ADA and ACA ratings are rough indicators of ideology and meaningful comparisons between years are difficult. _· The most va1id comparison is between ·
the average of Republicans or Democrats on the committee and the average .
for .all members of their party in the Senate in- a given year.

Ustrig this

indicator, the ideological divisions are nearly identical to their pattern
~

seven years ago.

Corrmittee Republicans are more conservative than all

Senate Repub 1i cans, and committee Democrats have ratings very close _to the ·
..

average for a11 -□emocrats ~

What is s i gni .fi cantly different is the numbers.

There are twice as many Republicans in the 97th Congress as there were on
the committee in the 94th Congress. While there are a handful of liberals
on the Democratic side, such as Metzenbaum, Riegle, Hart,. and Bi den, there
is a substantial conservative majority on the committee .. The freshman Republicans tend to be conservative like most of the Republicans elected ·in
1980.

In this· way, the conmitteedemonstrated a continuity in the ideolog-

ical stance of the two parties, but simultaneously reflects the electoral
turnover which has given the conservative minority in the 94th Congress .a
maj orfty on the committee in the 97th Congress.
1981 was an exceptional year.

The patterns identified in this year.

may not become trends, but some noticable shifts can be observed.· Looking
at the three key votes in the Reagan economic program in Table 3 compared
to the previous votes shown in.Table 1, a change can be seen.

The Republi-

TABLE 2SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM
(Ratings by Arrericaris for Democratic· Action-.;.ADA
and.Americans for Constitutional Action--ACA)

..

Senate Budget Committee--94th Congress*
Name

DEMOCRATS
ADA

Muskie (Maine)
. Mondale (Minn)
Cranston (Calif)
Biden (Del)
·
Magnuson (Wash)
Aboureszk (SD)
Moss (Utah)
Ch i1 es ( Fl a ) .
Hollings (SC)
Nunn (GA)
Average
:;

ACA

8
80
75
0
75
4
75 · 17
70
9
60
14
55
17
45
48
28
40
20 · 62

Name

REPUBLICANS
ADA

McClure (Idaho)
Do~eni ci (NM) •
Dole (Kans)
Buckley ~NY) Bellman Okla)_
Beall (Md)

.ACA
100
87
87
82
76
42

0
5
10
5
. 10
20

Average

8.3

79

59.5 20. 7 ·

Average, Senate
Average, Senate
63.3
25.7
Republicans
Democrats
54.3 23.2
Source: Congressi ona 1 Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1976
*Only one non-freshman joined the committee in the 95 Congress: Johnson (D-La. )--ADA=
15 , . ACA=56 .
Senate Budget Corrmittee--97th Congress
Name

;

DEMOCRATS
ADA

Hollings (SC)
Chiles (Fla)
Biden (De])
Johnston (La)
Sasser (Tenn)
Har4_ (Colo)
Metzenbaum (Ohio)
Riegle (Mich)
Moynihan (NY)
Exon (Neb)

39
50
67
33

67
61
83
84
47

21

ACA
43
38
18
29
23
36

12
15
15
39

;;:

Average
Average, Senate
Democrats
*Denotes Freshman

59.4

25.15

58.

26.

Name

REPUBLICANS
ADA

Domenici (Chair,NM)
Annstrong (Colo)
Kassebaum (Kan) ·
Hatch (Utah.)
Boschwitz (Minn)
Tower (Texas)
Andrews (ND)*
Symms (rdaho)*
Grassl ey (Iowa)*

17
11

.37
17
28
6

ACA
71
100
63
96
96
91

. Kasten ris)*

Quayle Ind)*
Gorton Wash)*
Ave.rage
Average, Senate
Re pub 1i cans

· 21.5
29.

85.9
73.

13
. cans in the Senate joined ranks to provide almost unanimous support for the
President's.program.

Formerly the least cohesive of the four caucuses,·

they displayed a cohesiveness similar tothat of-their Republican colleagues·
(Table 3 here)
in the House.

The Democrats became slightly less cohesive, but still tended

to support the budget rreasures by a 2·to 1111argin._
Republicans on the Budget Committee unanimously supported all three of
the key votes listed on Table 3.

Democrats on the comnittee divided on the

issues as shown in Table 4.. Seven of ten Democrats opposed the Republican
(Table 4 here)
majority's first resolution·, but only two of ten opposed .the tax bill in
late July .. In contrast to the Republicans, the· Democrats on the Budget committee displayed a fluid pattern of vet i ng as the minority party.

It appears ,

in general however, that the bipartisan atmosphere and patterns of decisionmaking established earlier continued under Republican leadership.
ENFORCING THE BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND RECONCILIATION
The greatest policy impact in the history of the budget process occurred
in 198i when significant reductions in current policy were approved.
-

The

-

Senate strained under the self imposed strictures of mandated reductions, but
less so than the House.

Tensions between the standing committees and the

Budget Corrmittee were inevitable.

To understand and eval~ate the effect of

the use of reconciliation in 1980 arid 1981, .it is necessary to review the
previous history of enforcement of the bud,get res·olutions in the Senate, the
i mj:>act of the budget process. on the othe·r standing committees in the Senate.
Particularly in making comparisions with the budget process in the
House, the demi nant image of the .Senate .Budget Committee. was agressi ve and·
expansionist.

Muskie and Bellmen were willing to challenge other powerful

_.,

"

TABLE 3

Key Senate Votes on Reagan's Economic Plan

Date

Measure

Vote

Northern - Southern
Republicans Democrats Democrats Democrats

5/12/81

1st Resolution FY 1982: Corrmittee
Report as amended

78-20

50-2

28-18

14-17

14-1

6/25/81

Omnibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981
Cammi ttee rep"ort as amended

81-15

52-0

28;.15

13-15

15-0

7/29/81

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
Co1TD11ittee report as amended

89-11

52.:.1

37-10

24-8

13-2

TABlE 4
Senate Budget Committee
Democratic Votes on Reagan.Economic Plan*
1st Resolution** .
FY 82

Tax Bill**

Chi l es {Fl a)

+

+

+.

Johnston {la)

+

+

+

Sasser (Tenn)

+

+

+

+

+

Exon

(Neb)

Hollings (~C)

•.

· Reconciliation**
Bill

+

Bi den {Del)

+

Reigle (Mich)

+

Moynihan (NY)

+
+ .

Metzenbaum (Ohio)

a

Hart (Col)

*Committee Republicans unanimously supported all three measures
**Same votes used in Table 3, Roll call #s 112, 182, 239
Yea=+
Nay = Not Voting= O
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committees in the .senate when the budget targets were in danger.

Did this

image adequately reflect the most typical relationship? The issue is not
whether there were 11 confHcts, 11 "power struggles," or ''budg~t battles" in
the Senate; it is a question of emphasis.not revision.

In reviewing the

. relationships between committees. leading up to reconciliation in 1981 we
will examine. episodes of conflict, routine patterns of'interaction, and
Senator's own assessments of the· relationships.
The Authorizing Committees and the Budget Committee·
One of the first big tests of the Senate Budget Committee arose in 1975
when Muskie challenged John Stennis· and the Armed Services Committee over a
military construction bi 1l. Even ma:ny- members of the Budget Committee were
surprised that. the Senate sided with Muskie. A few earl,1 episodes such as
this helped create the image of the Budget Committee and its leaders as ag- .
gressive protectors of the process .. Given this orientation, one might imag'

'

.ine that many members of the spending committees were unhappy with the budget process and Budget Committee. But this has not been the case~
The authorizing committees were generally satisfied with· the budget
process. There has been some grumbling about the March 15 reports and the
May 15 deadline for reporting authorizing legislatiQn because the time constraints faced by the committees: required a change iri their behavior. Mainly;
they were satisfied in the vast majority of cases. because tliey got what they
wanted in terms of money and programs.
The March 15 views·and estfmates submitted by the .standing cormnittees
-~

revealed strong advocacy for higher spending.

In this regard, their roles in

the spendi.ng process are in direct conflict with the role of the Budget Committee. But as rational decision-makers, they have- adapted to the system.
Their requests are expansive to insure-that their particular programs get a·

15
'place'· in the first resolution. 17 The Budget Conm1ttee has regularly reduced these requests, but not below what the conmittee could realistically
live with .. An apparent adversary relationship turned out to be cooperative
role playing. When the Budget Conmittee's cuts were toodeep, many an
unhappy committee could challenge and get its money restored by the full
Senate.
Section 402 of the Budget Act allows the May 15 deadline to be wafved
under special ci rcumstanc·es and the.waiver provisions .have been used quite
extensively.

In the Senate, authorizing committees must report a waiver

resolution that is referred to the Senate Budget Cormtittee for their recom- ·
mendati on to the full Senate. These requirements were not impJemented
until 1976, and in the next.three years, 101 waivers were .requested.· Only
:. .

a few of these requests were not recommended favorably. by the Senate Bud~·
get Committee, although in several other cases, the requests became moot.
One might have expected that the number of requests for waivers would
have
. declined as the Senate adjusted to tlie budget timetable.

In 1976,

21 waivers were requested, increasing to 43 in 1977 and 38 in 1978. Were
the requests for waivers justified? Table

5

lists the most common reasons

given by the authorizing committees for reporting legislation after the
deadline.

The two most prevalent reasons, delay caused by the administra(Table 5 here)

tion and unforeseen needs, appear consistent w'ith the justification for the
402 waiver procedures.

Other reasons, however, reflect delays that should

be correctable through better planning, such as workload, staff problems,
and unfamiliarities with procedures.
Certain committees in the Senate used the waiver.procedures more frequently than others.

Table 6 reveals that about 70% of the ,waivers were
(Table 6 here)

. TABLE 5
Reasons for Waiver of .Budget Act
1975-1978

(402 waivers - authorization deadlines)
Reason

# Cases

0) Delay caused by Administration

23

(2)

Emergency; unforeseen needs

20

(3)

Committee workload, inadequate time,
other priority legislation

19

(4)

Committee reorganization, adjournment,
staff problems

·13

(5)

Other congressional delays

12

: . (6)

•.

Committee error, unfamiliar with
procedures

5

(7)

No reason given ·

4

(8)

Other

6

•

N = 101

Campi led from 1ists of waiver requests and reasons supplied by Senate
Budget· Corrmittee

.

D

l

.

TABLE 6
Budget Act Waivers
Frequency by Senate Committees 1975-1978
Co1T111ittee

· Waivers Requested

Foreign Re 1a-ti ons
· Energy (Select)

11*
10**

Environment and Public Works

9

Agriculture

9**

Judiciary

9

Indian Affairs (Select)

8

Banking and Currency

6

Armed Services-

6
63

Others (4 or less each)

(34)***

* One request rece-ived unfavorable recommendation. from Senate Budget
Committee

** One request not acted on by Senate Budget Committee
'irk* Three requests :from individual members, not committees.
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requested by eight Senate conmittees. Foreign Relations headed the list with
eleven requests. Both Foreign Relations and the Select Conmittee on. Energy
had a greater problem.with administration-caused delays. Others, like Environment and Public Works, Agriculture, and Judiciary, have less valid reas.ons
·for frequent .waiver requests.
Why did not the Senate enforce the waiver provis:ions more rigorously
in the first few years? The reason was that the cost on antagonizing autho-.
rizing committees was not worth the benefit of cleaning up the loose ends
of the process. The fact that the· House has been somewhat more guarded in
granting waivers. despite their relative weakness, suggests again that the .
. Senate Budget Committee was very accommodating to the legislative committees.
The Appropriations Committee and the Budget Committee
Early in its existence, the Budget Committee challenged the Appropri- ·
ations Conmittee, and obtained approval from the Democratic caucus .for the
right to have joint jurisdiction with Appropriations in handling presiden~
tial rescissions and deferrals.

Ellwood and Thurber have argued that the

comparative advantage to Muskie and the committee was quite small, but that
it ,was important to assert their authority and establish their- existence. 18
Was this typical of their actions towards the Appropriations Committee?
Fonner Appropriations Chairman John McClelland was originally skeptical
but soon ·became a strong ally of Muskie ind the Budget Committee.· Despite
the challenge by Muskie over impoundment jurisdiction, the Senate Appropriations was not threatened by line-item estimates by the'Budget Corrmittee.
Muskie commented:
.•

"We do not go into the program detai'l that the Appropri ati ons ·committee does. If we were to do the actual allocation
by appropriation bill, we would be.doing the Appropriations
Committees' work. That_is nst our responsibility.· 19
The Senate Appropriations Committee had more to gain than their.-House

17
counterparts, since the new process enabled·the committee to approach parity

..

with the House,.· Joel Havemarin. concluqed that the budget process assisted
'

McClelland iri consolidating his power as chairman by givfng him more control
over the subcorrimittees. 2 For these reasons, the relationship emerged into

°

an alliance.
The members of both Budget and Appropriations indicated that the dominant pattern was one of cooperation. One member, who was on both comnittees,
commented::
From the start, there has been a mutual respect betwee·n
the two committees (Budget and Appropriations) ••• ! think
that Appropriations actually appreciates our efforts to hold.
down spending - it relieves some of the pressure on them. 21
A Democrat on the Appropriations· Committee echoed this sentiment:
We get along with them (Budget Committee) very well and
have had very few problems. At first some of my more senior
colleagues were resentful - felt a little threatened but we
have moved away from this after the first year. This has
been a meaningful change accomplished together, and I believe
we (on Appropriations) have improved our perfonnance. 22
Few appropriations bills were challenged by the Budget Committee on the
Senate floor. They have had their members constitute up to 40% of the Budget Committee, whfch helped insure that their interests were protected.

The

committee has also acted as an advocate in the.process. Appropriations subcommittee Chairman William Proxmire, self proclaimed budget cutter· and sponsor of the "Golden Fleece" award, described how experience taught.him how to
behave:
I made a low estimate and lived to regret it. I fought
for the estimate, but I lost. Ever since then I have· been a
little gunshy and I have attempted to come in high r11ther
than low. They (the estimates) can contain everything including the kitchen sink. It is easier and safer to suggest
a high figure so that in the end one will look good by coming
in under it rather than submitting a lower figure which may.
be exceeded. 23

18

The Appropriations subcommittees in -the Senate were able to insure that
the vast majority of their spending goals were achieved. Despite some·
overt cuts, the budget resolutions over the first five years expanded to
meet the desires of the Appropriations and authorizing comlllittees.The Finance Committee and the Budget Committee
There was less cooperation between the Senate Finance Committee and
the Budget Committee over this period. Senator Muskie's observations on
the~control exercised by Finance were only half-humorous.
The Finan;e Committee now controls the entire revenue
side of the budget, which is 50 percent of it.,· and then -if
you lo.ck at the spending side, medicare, medicaid, social security and so on - You add it altogether; yes, and I expect_
it is close to 75 percent-of tbe whole budget which _goes
through the Finance Committee. We don't focus on it, we let
it grow, and I don.'t blame Russell (Long) for not wanting
.
the budget process; he has got 75 percent of the budget now,
why should he give to anybody else any part of it? {Laughter). 24
The expansion of tax expenditures has allowed the Finance Committee to
enlarge its pol icy domain since the implementation of the budget process,
even if its discretion was reduced in other ways by re.forms in the early
1970s. · The Budget Act requires the Budget Committee, 11 to devise methods of
coordinating tax expenditures, policies and programs with direct budget
outlays," but the Act did not equate tax expenditures with direct outlays.
The Budget Committees list tax expenditures, but they are not approved in
the resolutions. ·There is no provision for Congress to directly contro_l
tax expenditures, or integrate revenue decisions with other budget choices.
To date, the Budget Committees have been unab_le to curb the expansion of
these individually popular measures, including the 1981 tax bill which contained a bonanza of tax expenditures.
When he was comm1 ttee .Cha fnnan, Russell Long resisted any attempts to
bring his cormiittee's actions under closer scrutiny arid centralized control.
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Senator Muskie described the root of the problem·: Our problem with Finance is that there is only one number in the budget resolution that -affects revenues, and that
is the overall revenue floor. If we adjust that to accommodate some total of tax expenditure reform, as we did two
years ago, $2 biJlion, you see Russell (Long) is astute
enough so he can put together a totally unanticipated package of offsetting changes in the revenue code that would
fit under the $2 bi 11 ion restriction ••• Russel 1 (long) plays
the game superbly. He is defending his committee's Jurisdiction and no comili ttee in the Senate has expanded its jurisdiction over more substantiveprogram areas ••• than Finance. 25
In the first budget resolution in 1976, the Senate Budget Committee
included a figure of $2 billion in revenue to- be gained from tax reform.
·Long opposed it on two grounds.

First, he pointed out that tax. reform leg-

islation usually does not take effect immediately, and second, .he argueo
that the Budget Co11111i ttee h·ad no ·right to i_ns truct the Fi n~-nce Committee. 26
Muskie and the committee held their position and took the fight to the
Senate floor, where Long prevailed in a number of votes.
Other conflicts took place in these first few years. The Finance Committee met the totals of the first resolution for FY 1978, but contrary to
Budget Corrmittee suggestions. The Budget Committee urged the Senate to
change the Finance Cormiittee's bill. Senator Lloyd Bentsen argued for the
Finance Committee:
If ft (the Budget Committee) can deal with-specificity
and detail as to which taxes should be raised and which
taxes should be lowered, then it has taken ·over the respons i bi 1ity of the Senate Finance Committee ••• If that happens,
you.are going to see·this same pattern followed in the Appropriations Conmittee and finally, in the other authorizing committees, and you will have seen the_ destruction, I
·
think, of the budget reform act. 27
The Senate upheld the position of the Finance Committee in a close vote.
Enough other committees (and a majority of committee chairmen) were concerned
about-the encroachments of the Budget Committees.· -

20
The Senate Budget Committee has played an active and often ass~rtive
role in enforcing the budget resolutions •. Some of their actions can be
attributed to the norma 1 desire of a commi tt~e protect and expand their :
power and jurisdiction.

Both Dennis Ippolito and Allen Schick generally

· arrive at similar conclusions concerning the impact of the budget process
.

.

on Senate corrmi t tees. - I ppo 11 to cone ludes -that· the Finance Committee re- fused to accept any formal recognition of the Budget Commjttee's expanded
claims. 28 He calls the budget committees 11 adding-machine committees that
take the demands of spending committees and impose as much restraint on them
_as the current congressional mood. allows. 11 29 Schick strongly emphasizes
the roll of accommodation in multiple dimensions of the budget process and
suggests that, 11 the trick for the Budget Committees is to accomrnodate·without .surrendering all meaningful enforcement. 1130 The experience with reconci 1iation in the Senate in 1981 might appear to provide the biggest cha·,_
lenge to the accommodation thesis.

In contrast with the House and in

comparing the policy impact of the budget process, reconciliation provides
an extremely useful perspective with which to complete our analysis.
Reconciliation
The reconciliation provisions are found in section 310(c)(d)(e) _of the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act.

In the original language of the ·statute,

the budget resolutions may determine that spending authority contained in
the laws, bills ·and resolutions of a committee- is to be changed.

If more

than one corrmittee is involved, the Budget Corrmittees receive recommendations
•

and report a bi 11 to the ful 1 chamber.

Debate in the Senate on any recon-

ciliation bill or resolution is limited to twenty hours.

Dormant for the

first five years of the budget process, it was first used in the Senate in
1980, resulting in a bill late in the year that produced cutbacks of about
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$8 billion.

Originally intended to ·be used at the end of the process in

conjunction with the second resolution, reconciliation was chosen as the.
vehicle for the Reagan administration to achieve its desired budget cutbacks at the beginning of the congressional budget process. This adapta. ti on of the reconcfl i ati on process was not done by amending the budget
act, but simply by providing for it through a concurrent resolution. Al-

~

though a number of legal and parl iarnentary. issues have been, rai·sed concerning the use of reconciliation, the real issues are political. ·eongress
can operate under any set of rules they see fit and the events·of 1981 represent the wishes of a majority. But the House and Senate went about the
task differently.
The first resolution passed in Mai mandated cutting over $35 billion
from existing programs. After a month of arguing,. haggling, bargaining
.,.

into the wee hours of the morning, the Senat.e arrtved at a package that,
if not enthusiastically endorsed, was acceptable to a majority. Senator
Edward Kennedy commented on the package of cuts adopted by the Committee.
on Labor and Human services, where he is ranking minority member of a com- ·
mittee chaired

by

conservative Senator Orrin Hatch.

These are si gni fi cant victories that make our reconci 1i ati on package a major improvement over the admi ni strati. on' s
original proposals. They have been achieved with bipartisan
support on the committee. They have been accepted by the administration, the majority leader, and the ·chairman of the
Budget committee. 31
The House, too, had a.month of cutting and struggling with the reconciliation package, but in contrast to the grudging acceptance by Senators,
the stunned Democratic 1eaders and committee chai nnen saw their work com:- ·
pletely thrown out and replaced by a hastily assembled substitute largely
dictated by the Reagan administration. Note the conments or Representative Kika de la Garza, Chairman of the House Agriculture Conmittee.
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I resent the fact that the Committee on Agriculture of
the House of Representatives and.their members, their power
and their jurisdiction have been µsurped by a Member of this
House* and some unelected member of the administration** and
in some corner or some dark alley or hallway or heaven knows
where they meet; they wrote and maybe are still writing what
is going to be our package for agriculture. I resent and I
challenge the right of anyone to do that. · 32
While reconciliation may have had a significant effect on the congressional connnittee system, on the emphasis of lawmaking over representation, 33
and on legislative-executive power in natfonal politics, the Senate appears.

-

to have done less violence to its norms, procedures, and legislative process.·
· The 11 tyrannical majority" did not rule, as in the House.
Without minimizing the radical nature .of the reconciliation process in
the Senate, there is evidence t.o suggest that some of the earlier patterns_
established by the Budget Connnittee in accommodating the needs of the other
~-

committees was exhibited in drafting the reconciliation- biJl.

There is evi-

dence to suggest that the bipartisan spirit on the Budget Committee developed
by the Democrats when they were in the majority prevented all out warfare
when the Republicans gained control of the Senate. There is evidence that
compared to -the House,_ traditional norms of autonomy, reciprocity, and the
individualized power structure carried over even to the.way reconciliation
was handled.
CONCLUSION Much more can be said about.the impacts of the budget process on the
Senate. This paper has attempted to take an overv.i ew of some of the di fferent results.

The events of 1981, which challenged some of our previous

i

conclusions and reinforced others, demonstratf:!s therdynamic quality of con-

*Representative Phil Gramn (D-Tex)
**Budget Director David Stockman
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gressional budgeting. Nonetheless, some general·conclusions can be suggested.
The. budget process added a degree of order and discipline to Senate
deliberations on the budget not previously seen. The .Senate Budget Conmittee became a significant force tn the legislative process and in the formu-·
lation of taxing and spending policy. The quality of budgetary information
in the· Senate has improved due to the activities of the·congressional Budget
Office and the staff of the Budget Conmittee. Differences with the House
.

.

.

Budget Committee and the Budget process in the House provide additional insi,ghts into the Senate. We observed differences in the impact of-ideological
cleavages, partisanship, styles of leadership, and relationships to other
committees.

It seems clear that despite the seemingly radic.al and central-

izing nature of the budget process, that in many ways. it was i-mplemented in
a manner consistent with Senate traditions.
Accommodation to the other conmittees and the power structure of the
Senate was cited in a number of instances, from the drafting of the l egi s1at ion to its implementation to, most recently, the way reconciliation was

hanqled.

In terms of procedural impact, the budget process has had a sig-

nificant impact on the Senate, but it clearly_ has not solved all_-the problems. Although the record in completing action on spending bills in a
timely and orderly fashion was excellent in the first few years of the
process, 1980-and 1981 resembled the chaos of the prerefonn years. This
·problem was particularly actute in the Senate in the fall of 1981 when,
without the leadership of the· White House, the Republican majority seemed
i

.,.

.

.

.

incapable of bringing the budget to an orderly conclusion.

For the first

tine in seven years, Congress failed to finish their process, opting simply
to reco-nfirm the first resolution with its obviously inaccurate assumptions.
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The impact of the budget process on budget totals and national policy
was surprisingly small before 1981.

Despite some pronounced House-Senate

differences, the totals that the two bodies arrived were remarkably similar,
and not significantly different from current policy baselines.

While a

number of important choices were made using the budget process on an indi. vidual basis, the aggregate of budget decisions did not depart from a pattern of steady growth.

Not until 1981, spurred by leadership from the

Reagan administration, did the budget process produce a striking policy effect.
It may seem ironic to some that the budget process which was implemented to
make Congress more independent froin the president had its first rea 1 -impact
because of presidential leadership..

Despite the furor over reconci li at ion.

and regardless of what one thinks of the speci fie budget cuts, the fact that
..

majorities· in_ Congress were able to respond in a quick and orderly fashion
is more a tribute to the p.rocess than· an_ indictment.·
The budget process has had an impact on power in _the Senate and in national government.

In the first seven years, Congress demonstrated both that

they could be independent from the President (Ford's first budget, for example)
and that they could be responsive to a president.
here.

Other factors are critical

Reagan is not- Nixon and 1982 is different than 1972 in terms of pres-

idential-congressional relations.

Perhaps the Senate cooperation with Reagan

is more typical of the relationship that will emerge in the future than the
experience of either Ford or Carter.

In terms of power within Congress, the

Senate seems to be more nearly the equal of the House in matters of taxing
and spending.

The budget process has been a great leveler in that regard.

i

Reconciliation as practiced in 1981 is most probably an anomaly.

The comnft-

tee system is not dead, and the Budget committees have not supplanted other
spending committees.

But the experience has demonstrated the potential of the
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congress i ona 1 budget., process.

Only the future wi 11 revea 1 how the Congress

will respond to the growing frustrations of estimation, uncontrollables,
off-budget items, and economic assumptions which threaten to scuttle serious
policy making. Whatever the difficulties, it seems clear that the Senate ··
and the entire Congress is better equipped to deal with th~m than they were
before 1975 .

.

;;;
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